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BAIL AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM
AND THE FAILURES OF NEW YORK'S REVISION
NEIL FABiCAlv*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper discusses the major civil liberties concerns presented by that
portion of the Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law1 (hereinafter
referred to as Proposed Code) dealing with the question of bail. The bail sections
are analyzed under three broad categories: (a) equal protection; (b) procedural
and substantive due process; and (c) preventive detention, the latter being
treated separately, although analyzed in the context of the first two categories.
Our concern for equal protection is predicated upon the generally accepted
principle that, as nearly as possible, the rich and the poor must receive equal
treatment before the law. Indeed, at least in the administration of the criminal
law, that principle is a constitutional imperative.2 The present New York bail
system is incompatible both in philosophy and in practice with the achievement
of this goal. It is a money-based system resting largely upon the accused's ability
to raise sufficient collateral to satisfy a private professional bondsman that his
risk of loss is outweighed by the premium he receives for furnishing a bail bond.
On its face then, the system falls most heavily upon the poor.
In contrast, the Federal Bail Reform Act3 represents an effort to move from
a simple, money-oriented system towards a more flexible and individualized
approach. The act establishes an order of priorities and requires the court to
impose the least onerous, non-financial condition of pretrial release which will in-
sure the defendant's future appearance.4 The Proposed Code perpetuates a con-
* LL.B., Brooklyn Law School; Legislative Director, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union.
1. Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law (Edward Thompson Co. ed., 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Code].
2. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3145 et seq.
4. Section 3146 of the Federal Bail Reform Act provides: "Release in noncapital
cases prior to trial (a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punish-
able by death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending
trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond
in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise
of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required. When such a determination is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of
or in addition to the above methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions
of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no
single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to
supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during
the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the deposit
in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a sum not to exceed
10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned upon the perfor-
mance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit
of cash in lieu thereof; or
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cededly archaic and unjust system5 by reversing the order of priorities contained
in the federal act and by providing that unless the court explicitly authorizes a
non-secured form of bail, the defendant must furnish the collateral ordinarily
required for release.6
Before further discussing the specific provisions of the proposed code with
which this paper is in disagreement, it is important to comprehend fully the
consequences of pretrial detention.
A. The Consequences of Pretrial Detention
Nothing that has not been said before by other commentators will be
found here. 7 Yet those who are unfamiliar with the day to day operations of an
urban criminal court system tend to view the bail problem as one which is
wholly unrelated to the substantive adjudication of guilt or innocence. The
issue is seen in terms of unjust detention for a relatively short period of time s
balanced against the state's interest in insuring the defendant's appearance at
trial. If the defendant is convicted, he receives credit for the time served prior to
trial. If he is acquitted or his case is dismissed, the system has unjustly deprived
him of his liberty. That, it is felt, may be an unfair result; but, it is argued, (a)
some system is essential to secure the state's objective; (b) under any system
dealing with massive numbers of people, some will be treated unfairly; and (c)
this system releases those persons who represent a minimal risk of flight (preven-
tive detention is not often articulated as a legitimate purpose) and detains those
who cannot give some assurance that they will not flee.
These arguments seem to make a good deal of sense until one examines the
entire complex of values impinged upon by the bail system as presently con-
stituted. In recent years, statistical data has been steadily accumulating which,
although lacking in total mathematical certainty, tends to establish the following
conclusions:
(1) The defendant who cannot post bail is under great pressure to plead
guilty for reasons unrelated to actual guilt. This is because living conditions in
pretrial detention centers are notoriously poor. Space and facilities are designed
for temporary detention and are wholly inadequate to meet current needs. The
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance as
required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after specified
hours."
5. "Possibly the most archaic and poorly drawn provisions of the Criminal Code are
those dealing with the subject of bail." Proposed Code, Title V, comm'n staff notes.
6. Proposed Code, § 280.10.
7. See generally, Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev.
959, 1125 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote]; Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Reltention,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 641 (1964).
8. In fact, many defendants are imprisoned for months awaiting trial. See New York
State Judicial Conference, Thirteenth Annual Report at 37 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The
Judicial Conference Report].
9. ". . . all detention institutions of the Department of Correction are grossly over-
crowded. By way of illustration, it is reported that there is a total population in the City
detention institutions of 4,133 persons, although their rated capacity is only 2,964 persons."
The Judicial Conference Report at 69.
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situation has become so critical that in New York City, defendants awaiting
trial are frequently transported to the New York City Penitentiary on Rikers
Island, an already overcrowded institution meant to house only convicted men,
generally serving sentences of one year or less.
This writer has time and again encountered defendants unable to post bail
who, solely because of intolerable living conditions, have insisted upon entering
guilty pleas where they were either innocent in fact or where convictions could
not have been otherwise obtained. These men preferred to begin "doing their
time" in prison rather than to wait for a trial under such conditions.10
(2) Assuming, however, that the defendant is tenacious enough to with-
stand the rigors of pretrial confinement and insists upon trial,'1 he is nonethe-
less at a serious disadvantage. A visit with one's client must be made in con-
formity with the often stringent rules and regulations of the detention center
rather than at the attorney's convenience and in the comforting surroundings
of his law office. This factor inevitably reduces the number of attorney-client
consultations. It is impossible to know the exact degree of prejudice suffered by
the accused who cannot consult with his attorney as frequently as others who are
free pending trial. It seems fair to suggest, however, that there is some prejudice.
Even more important is the fact that the defendant cannot assist his at-
torney in the actual preparation of the case. He cannot secure witnesses; nor
can he help in the investigatory process so essential to the defense of a criminal
prosecution. If, as is often the case, the attorney is white and the client black,
the attorney himself, even if he is willing to undertake the entire burden of
investigation, is seriously handicapped; few people in ghetto communities will
discuss criminal matters with white men. These factors, coupled with the fact that
the incarcerated defendant is less likely to appear before the jury neatly dressed
and, in general, as presentable as the defendant who is at liberty, may very well
prejudice the fact-finding process and render counsel's representation less ef-
fective than would be the case had the defendant been free prior to trial.
(3) Assuming that the defendant has been convicted, the next step in the
criminal process is the sentence. A probation officer will sift the available
evidence and determine whether this defendant is a good probation risk or
10. There are, of course, many factors which will induce an accused into entering a
guilty plea. He may, for example, be genuinely remorseful; he may be offered a lesser
sentence; or he may be humiliated by the prospect of a jury trial. However, in this writer's
view, the remarkable rate of defendants who enter guilty pleas in the state system must, in
some unknowable percentage, be attributed to the fact of pretrial detention. Within the
City of New York, for example, for the period beginning July 1, 1966 through June 30,
1967, out of 10,510 indictments disposed of (excluding 1,136 dismissed by the Court), 8,981
were disposed of by guilty pleas. (The Judicial Conference Report app. at 123). That pre-
trial detention is sometimes deliberately employed as a device for securing a guilty plea has
received judicial recognition by at least one court. People ex rel. Thompson v. Warden, 214
N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Detention is also sometimes used as punishment where the
court feels that the defendant or counsel has been dilatory. See People v. Olan, 8 N.Y.2d
1084, 1086, 207 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (1960).
11. In New York 'County for the same period there were only 134 trials out of a
total of 4,956 indictments. The Judicial Conference Report app. at 123.
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whether a jail sentence is called for. He then makes a recommendation to the
sentencing judge. Here, too, a jailed defendant is at a real disadvantage. The
factors entering into the sentencing, apart from the criminal act itself, include
such things as family ties, steady employment and the defendant's life circum-
stances during the pendency of the prosecution. A man who has been free prior
to trial has had an opportunity to demonstrate his capacity to meet the re-
sponsibility of probation. He will probably have had a steady job (if for no other
reason than to pay his lawyer). He will have been able to continue to support
his family. He will have appeared in court at the appropriate times. The jailed
defendant will undoubtedly have lost his job, and his family may have been
forced to welfare, thus rendering his financial support less meaningful.
A study of approximately 750 defendants arraigned in Manhattan
Magistrate's Felony Court between October 16, 1961 and September 1, 1962
disclosed that ". . sixty-four percent of the 358 defendants who were con-
tinuously in jail from arraignment to adjudication were sentenced to prison.
On the other hand, only seventeen percent of the 374 who made bail received
prison sentences." 12 Holding constant a number of other factors which might
have explained this remarkable disparity in terms other than the bail problem,
the author of the study, concluded as follows:
This study has demonstrated that each of five characteristics-
prior record, bail amount, type of counsel, family integration, and em-
ployment stability-when considered separately do not account for
the statistical relationship between detention before adjudication and
unfavorable disposition. When the characteristics are considered in
combination, they account for only a small part of the relationship.la
Finally, the sentencing judge is far more reluctant to imprison a defendant
who stands before him as a free man holding a job and supporting a family than
would be the case of a defendant already in jail. The former decision requires
an affirmative and rather drastic uprooting of the defendant's life just at the
point when he seems to be on the road to rehabilitation; the latter involves
nothing more than continuing the imprisonment of a convicted felon who has
not demonstrated his reformability. Understandably, the judge may overlook the
fact that the essential difference between the two men may have been only the
latter's inability to post bail. Furthermore, even where the defendant who has
not been bailed is acquitted, he will have probably suffered irretrievable damage
beyond the fact of detention. His job, his family structure, his housing-the
totality of his life circumstances-are almost certain to have deteriorated during
the period of confinement.
Thus, it is evident that the prejudicial effects of pretrial detention pollute
the entire criminal process from the preparation for trial to the sentence or
12. Rankin, supra note 7 at 655.
13. Id. See also, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 693 (1958).
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acquittal. With these facts in mind, we may now turn to an examination of the
Proposed Code and its resolution of the competing social interests.
I. LEGAL INPLICATIONs ARISING FROm THE
BAIL PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED CODE
A. Procedural Due Process
First, section 280.10 sets forth in the following order eight authorized forms
of bail: (a) cash bail; (b) an insurance company bail bond; (c) a secured surety
bond; (d) a secured appearance bond; (e) a partially secured surety bond; (f)
a partially secured appearance bond; (g) an unsecured surety bond; (h) an
unsecured appearance bond. The court may designate the amount of bail without
specifying the form or forms under which it may be posted, in which case only
the first four methods may be used. These all require the posting of collateral to
satisfy the face amount of the bond.
Here again, a working knowledge of an urban criminal court system is es-
sential to an understanding of the practical impact of the order of priorities
cited above. The chief characteristic of the New York City criminal court
system is its staggering caseload.14 Arraignment proceedings are handled at
breakneck speed with the arraigning judge arriving at his decision on bail within
seconds. Although low cash bail is an available alternative under the present
system, it is infrequently used. In the vast majority of cases, the judge simply
announces a sum and proceeds to the next case. Were he to do anything else he
could not complete his daily calendar of over one hundred cases. 15
Since 1964, the New York City office of probation has been screening an
increasing number of defendants for parole (R.O.R. or released on own recogniz-
ance) and submitting written findings to the court. However, their recommenda-
tions for release involve only a minute fraction of the total arraignment
population, and even there only a relatively small percentage of their recom-
mendations are acted upon by the court.16
14. One Criminal Court judge, with a reputation for exceptional ability and fair-
mindedness, in granting a motion to set aside a conviction based upon a guilty plea, de-
scribed the situation quite candidly: "The large number of cases assigned to be heard and
disposed of at each session of the court creates a pressure for speed in hearing and determi-
nation which necessarily affects the administration of justice adversely. This pressure has
made it most difficult for this court, although it has meticulously tried to do so, to observe
all the safeguards required by due process, to insure that every defendant in the criminal
matters coming before it is advised of the full extent of his right to counsel.... This court
has made clear its abhorrence of disposing of record numbers of cases in the briefest possible
time if it hampers the doing of justice." People v. Sardone, 48 Misc. 2d 125, 130 (Rosenberg,
J., N.Y.C. Cr. Ct., 1964).
15. The enormous number of cases disposed of each day in the New York City
Criminal 'Court is often cited as a reason for denying the right to trial by jury in that court.
See, e.g., People v. Morganbesser, 293 N.Y.S.2d 397, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
16. Interviews with court personnel suggest that the increasingly strident cry for
"law and order" has begun to seep into the courtroom in the form of higher bail and fewer
R.O.R.'s. Criminal Court judges have reportedly ignored these recommendations far more
often than in the past.
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Given these courtroom conditions, the mere fact that the judge has available
:several new forms of bail is unlikely to result in a significant reduction of the
pretrial prison population. This is underscored by the fact that the order of
priorities set forth above conditions release without security upon the affirmative
exercise of judicial discretion. Unless the judge carefully considers the possible
alternatives and selects one which does not require collateral, the defendant will
be compelled to furnish a secured bond or cash. In an arraignment process in
which: (a) the judge must decide whether to assign an attorney; (b) the charges
are read to the defendant; (c) a decision is made whether to reduce the charge,
hold a preliminary hearing or waive to the Grand Jury in felony cases; and (d)
an adjournment date is decided upon, all in a matter of a minute or two, it
seems safe to predict that the judges will continue to fix bail in precisely the
same manner in which bail is set today.
Second, the first four "automatic" methods of posting bail are not mean-
ingful alternatives. The secured appearance bond is defined as nothing more
than a "bail bond in which the only obligor is the principal." 17 A "secured bail
bond" is one in which the security is furnished by "personal property which is
not exempt from execution and which, over and above all liabilities and encum-
brances, has a value equal to or greater than the total amount of the under-
taking; or (b) real property having a value of at least twice the total amount
of the undertaking."' 8
Currently, bail bondsmen will often write bonds requiring less collateral
than this provision would command. The Proposed Code therefore offers nothing
more than the saving of a very small premium with the added burden of furnish-
ing collateral in an amount not presently required. It seems fair to suggest that
any defendant unable to post bond under present conditions would likewise be
unable to do so under the Proposed Code.
Third, the present Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the judges of the
New York City Criminal Court to admit to bail any defendant regardless of
prior record so long as the District Attorney's office is represented or has been
notified.19 Notwithstanding the absence of evidence indicating that this dis-
cretion has been erroneously exercised in favor of defendants generally, the
Proposed Code eliminates that discretion where the defendant has two prior
felony convictions or is charged with a Class A felony.20 While as a practical
matter few defendants so situated will be freed pending trial, there is no reason
to eliminate the discretion to do so. Hopefully, the omission is inadvertent and
will be corrected prior to passage.
Fourth, the Proposed Code carries forward a provision which requires finger-
printing in the more serious felony and misdemeanor cases prior to the setting
17. Proposed Code § 270.10(14).
18. Id. § 270.10(17).
19. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 552 (McKinney 1958) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc.].
20. Proposed Code § 390.30(2) (a).
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of bail.2 1 However, unlike the present, Code of Criminal Procedure, it prohibits
the fixing of bail unless and until "[t]he court has been furnished with a report
of the New York State identification and intelligence system concerning the
defendant's criminal record if any. .. 22 Presumably, in the event of a failure
of communication or delay, the defendant will remain in jail.
Fifth, section 390.40(3) of the Proposed Code provides that only one bail
application may be made to a superior court judge challenging the lower court's
refusal to set bail or its fixing of excessive bail. This provision is particularly
unfortunate since circumstances may and often do change during incarceration.
Moreover, habeas corpus does not lie to exercise a de novo discretion, but only
to reverse an arbitrary decision.2 3
In New York, in previous years, all defendants who were incarcerated prior
to trial for more than 48 hours would automatically have their status reviewed
by a judge other than the arraigning judge. Many such bail reviews resulted in
lower bail or parole. One of the important explanations for this is the fact that
the arraigning judge, aside from being under severe pressure by the number of
cases, is subject to more subtle pressures from the presence in court of complain-
ing witnesses and the police officer. He often feels that parole of a defendant,
even if there is no indication of flight, will seem too "soft" or too callous with
respect to the complaining witness' grievance. An unhurried and automatic bail
review in the absence of such pressures is valuable and should be restored in the
Proposed Code.
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to the Proposed Code is its basic
assumption that the right to bail is wholly discretionary,2 4 and that the legisla-
ture may withhold that right altogether or may delegate the power to withhold
to the judiciary.25 Acting upon that assumption, the Proposed Code carries
forward the present code provision which authorizes the discretionary denial
of bail in all felony cases. 26 The position taken here is that the eighth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution establishes a right to bail which may
21. Compare, Proposed Code § 390.30(2) (b) with N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 552-a.
22. Proposed Code § 390.30(2) (b).
23. People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393 (1943).
24. See, Proposed Code, art. 390.
25. Id. Comm'n Staff Notes. Only a small minority of states have taken this position.
Approximately 40 states guarantee a right to bail before conviction in non-capital cases.
See, Index to State Constitutions, 5 (Colum. Univ. Press 1960). This right is generally re-
garded as absolute in non-capital cases. See, e.g., In re McGarry, 380 Ill. 359, 44 N.E.2d 7
(1942). New Jersey has taken the position that unless the proof of guilt is "evident and
the presumption great," there is an absolute right to bail. The New Jersey Supreme Court
held: "As a consequence of the Constitution the right of the individual to bail became a
basic one. Now the courts are under a mandate to allow bail in all criminal cases, including
capital offenses . . . excluding only those instances of capital offenses 'when the proof is
evident or the presumption great.' . . . Release on bond is a concomitant of the presumption
of innocence. Refusal of freedom in violation of the mandate of our organic law would
constitute punishment before conviction, a notion abhorrent to our democratic system."
State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 369-70, 164 A.2d 740, 742-43 (1960).
26. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 553(2).
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not be abridged by state legislatures. The discussion which follows is in support
of that view.
B. Substantive Due Process and the Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment provides as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment in-
flicted."
The leading New York bail case is People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of
City Prison.27 There, the defendant, a thrice convicted felon was charged with
extortion under two indictments totalling 47 counts. The prosecutor opposed
the setting of bail in any amount. The Court of General Sessions thereupon
held a hearing to determine whether bail should be granted and, if so, its ap-
propriate amount. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied bail on
several grounds, among them, the defendant's failure to surrender after the
affirmance of a conviction, and the existence of an extensive criminal record.
The defendant's brother petitioned the State Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. The writ was granted and bail was set at $100,000. A divided
Appellate Division dismissed the writ 2s and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Judge Desmond, writing for a unanimous court, observed that while most
states have constitutional provisions making bail a matter of right in capital
cases, New York, whose constitutional provision in this matter is modeled on
the eighth amendment, "accords no accused any right to bail, but serves only
to forbid excessiveness.1 29 This pronouncement of Judge Desmond provides
the judicial framework upon which the revisers have based their conclusion
that the right to bail is a matter of legislative discretion.
Carlson v. Landon,30 in which the Supreme Court upheld the denial of
bail in deportation proceedings, lends some support for the above position. Carlson,
however, was a deportation proceeding involving the rights of Communist aliens
and was decided at the height of the cold war by a 5-4 decision. Its applic-
ability to criminal proceedings was dubious to begin with, and, in view of the
heightened sensitivity to the rights of the criminal defendant, 31 seems more
so today.
In Stack v. Boyle,32 decided during the same term as Carlson, the Court,
although relying primarily on the judiciary Act of 178933 and Rule 46 (a) (1)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, hinted strongly at a constitutional
right to bail. In remanding to the district court, for purposes of a bail hearing,
27. 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943).
28. People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 265 App. Div. 474, 39 N.Y.S.2d
526 (lst Dep't 1943).
29. 290 N.Y.2d at 398, 49 N.E.2d at 500.
30. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
31. See, e.g., Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
32. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
33. 1 Stat. 73.
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the case of twelve alleged Smith Acts4 conspirators whose bail had been clearly
excessive, the Court observed:
This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the un-
hampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction.... Bail set at a figure higher than
an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose [i.e., assurance
of the presence of an accused] is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amend-
ment. (See United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926), opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler as Circuit Justice of the Seventh Circuit).35
The Court's reliance upon Justice Butler's opinion as a Circuit Justice in
the Motlow case is significant. In that case Justice Butler observed:
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be re-
quired." This implies, and therefore safeguards, the right to give bail
at least before trial. The purpose is to prevent the practical denial of
bail by fixing the amount so unreasonably high that it cannot be given.
The provision forbidding excessive bail would be futile if magistrates
were left free to deny bail.3 6
The logic of that observation seems as compelling today as it was in 1926.
Moreover, those who argue that the eighth amendment's bail provision does
not imply a right to bail, but is simply a prohibitioh against the setting of
"excessive" bail where the legislature has established the right, have serious
difficulty reconciling that view with the clear intent of the entire Bill of Rights
to impose limitations upon legislative rather than judicial action.3 7
The second line of argument commonly advanced by those who would
deny a federally guaranteed right to bail in state prosecutions is the inapplic-
ability of the eighth amendment to the state criminal process. That position
has little to recommend it. In Robinson v. California,38 the Court incorporated
the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause into the four-
teenth, and, in view of the consistency with which the Court has incorporated
virtually the entire Bill of Rights, it seems highly unlikely that the bail pro-
vision will be treated differently.39 One circuit court has already assumed its
incorporation without discussion. 40
In light of the foregoing analysis it seems fair to suggest that the Proposed
Code's basic premise-the discretionary nature of bail-may soon be entirely
undercut by a Supreme Court decision which incorporates the eighth amend-
34. 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) §§ 171, 2385.
35. 242 U.S. at 45.
36. United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (1926).
37. The historical evidence supporting a constitutional right to bail has been docu-
mented in Foote at 959 et seq. Some courts have taken the position urged here. See, e.g.,
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D. D.C. 1960). Cf. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 70&
(8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
38. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
39. See cases cited supra note 31.
40. See Pilkington v. Circuit Court of Howell County, Missouri, 324 F.2d 45 (8th:
Cir. 1963).
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ment's right to bail as interpreted here. The right to have bail fixed is, how-
ever, only the threshold question. The granting of bail in an amount beyond
the defendant's reach works to deny an accused his freedom prior to trial as
effectively as if no bail were fixed at all. The position taken here is that there
is not simply a federally guaranteed right to have bail fixed but a federally
guaranteed right to pretrial freedom which may be abridged only under ex-
treme, high-risk circumstances.
C. Equal Protection
In Griffin v. Illinois,41 the Supreme Court held that Illinois could not, con-
sistent with the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, deny an
indigent defendant a stenographic transcript of his trial when such transcript
was necessary to full appellate review and when it was available to an appellant
who could afford it. The Griffin decision was unusual because, as Justice Harlan
pointed out in dissent, the state had not discriminated against the indigent
appellant, but rather had failed to place the indigent on an equal footing with
the defendant of means.4 2 In his view, "the Equal Protection Clause [does not]
impose on the States an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from
differences in economic circumstances. 4 3 Nor could the dissenting Justice find
support in the due process clause for the concededly desirable policy of pro-
viding indigents access to the appellate process on an equal basis with the
rich.44 The state's failure to provide a transcript was not, in Justice Harlan's
view, a "denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice." 45 Justice Black's majority opinion contained the simple and powerful
response that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has."14 6
Justices Minton, Burton and Reed, also in dissent, applied the logic of
the majority opinion to the bail problem when they observed that "[s]ome
[defendants] can afford bail, some cannot. Why fix bail at any reasonable sum
if a poor man can't make it."14 7 Griffin's progeny has transformed that question,
intended then to point up the majority's erroneous reasoning, into a very real
possibility. Recent decisional law strongly suggests that, in the area of criminal
justice, the interplay between due process and equal protection48 requires that
the inequality between rich and poor, whether a result of affirmative state
action or failure to act, must be corrected where such inequality infects the
fact finding process itself.49
41. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id., citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
46. 351 U.S. 12 at 19 (1956).
47. Id. at 29 (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting).
48. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
49. See Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252 (1959); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
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In a footnote to the Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona,50 Chief Justice
Warren cited with approval the following excerpt from the Report of the At-
torney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal
Criminal Justice:
When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal
area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking reasonable
measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just admin-
istration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government
may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may prop-
erly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administra-
tion of justice.51
The Chief Justice then added that:
[d]enial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while
allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more
supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and
on appeal struck down in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).52
The Court in Miranda was concerned with the prejudicial effect of pretrial
interrogation in the absence of counsel. The fourfold warnings required in
Miranda were predicated upon both due process and equal protection grounds.
Interrogators were required not only to advise an accused of his right to counsel
and privilege against self-incrimination, but were also required either to pro-
vide counsel to an indigent who did not want to talk in the absence of counsel,
or to forego interrogation until counsel was provided. Previously, the Court
had ruled that an indigent must be provided with counsel at arraignment pro-
ceedings. In Hamilton v. Alabama,-m the Court reversed petitioner's conviction
because he had been denied counsel at the time of arraignment which, under
Alabama law, the Court found was a critical stage in the criminal proceeding.
In Hamilton, Miranda, Gideon and several other cases,54 the Court viewed
the practical effects of denying to the indigent defendant the rights customarily
accorded the accused with financial resources. While certain disabilities flowing
from poverty are not subject to judicial fiat (e.g. it seems safe to predict that the
Court will not reverse a criminal conviction on the ground that the indigent
could not retain one of America's most noted trial attorneys as counsel), wher-
ever the Court finds a real possibility of prejudice, it will require the state to
elevate the indigent to equal status. All that has been said with respect to the
708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S.
192 (1966); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); see also, Sachs, Indigent
Court Costs and Bail, 27 Maryland L. Rev. 154 (1967).
50. 384U.S. 436 (1965).
51. Id. at 472, 473, fn. 41, citing Rep't of the Att'y Gen'1's Comm. on Poverty and
the Administration of Criminal justice 9 (1963).
52. Id. at 473.
53. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
54. See cases cited supra note 48.
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consequences of pretrial detention, points to the fact that the decision to in-
carcerate an accused by the fixing of bail in an amount too high for him to
meet is perhaps the most critical decision in the criminal process. An approach
which simply incorporates the eighth amendment's bail provision will not suf-
fice. The prejudicial impact of pretrial detention is not ameliorated by the re-
quirement that an accused indigent be permitted to make bail where it is
obvious that he cannot.
In Bandy v. United States,55 Justice Douglas, sitting as a Circuit Justice
in passing upon a bail application, observed:
Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be
denied release because of indigence. Instead, under our Constitutional
system, a man is entitled to be released on 'personal recognizance'
where other relevant factors make it reasonable to believe that he will
comply with the orders of the Court.56
Justice Douglas' dictum has received widespread attention and may well be
the approach ultimately taken by the majority of the Justices when the issue
finally reaches the Court.5'
Thus, there are two independent grounds by which the bail provisions of
the Proposed Code may be rendered obsolete: (a) incorporation into the four-
teenth amendment of an eighth amendment right to bail, or (b) a ruling under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment narrowly circumscrib-
ing the right to impose financial conditions upon pretrial release.
There is a third approach, the philosophy of which closely resembles the
approach taken by the Federal Bail Reform Act:5 8 the right to pretrial freedom
should be elevated to a preferred status in the hierarchy of personal liberties.
An analogy will be helpful in illustrating this point. In Kent v. Dulles,50 the
Supreme Court held that the freedom of movement ". . . is a part of the liberty
of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment. '60 Earlier in Edwards v. California,6 the Court had in-
validated a California criminal statute which imposed sanctions upon persons
aiding and abetting the immigration of indigents into the State. The Court
made it clear that indigency was an insufficient basis for abridging freedom of
movement within the United States. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,62 the
Court elevated to a preferred status the freedom to travel established in Ed-
wards and Kent.6 3 It did so because of its important relationship to first amend-
55. 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1961).
56. Id. at 13.
57. For an extensive history of the Bandy decision and its apparent currency with other
Justices of the Court, see Foote at 1155.
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3147-3152 (1966).
59. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
60. Id. at 125.
61. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
62. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
63. See, Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes
of Status, 3 Crim. Law Bull. 205 (1967).
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ment rights (the securing of information, for example). By referring to these
cases, it is not meant to suggest that the constitutional right to freedom of
movement provides an independent ground for rejecting the state's power to
detain a person prior to trial. The position taken here is that pretrial freedom
has an independent constitutional basis beyond the right to bail (the simple
right to bail does not meet current standards of equal protection);. and that
the freedom itself, because of its critical importance in securing another funda-
mental right-the right to a fair trial-should be accorded a preferential status.
Of course, such freedom is not an absolute; neither is the freedom to travel. 64
However, once we accept the notion that the right is constitutionally preferred,
certain well established principles come into play.
The first and foremost principle is the necessity of limiting the abridge-
ment of the right in the narrowest possible manner. 65 This approach grew out
of first amendment case law, but was applied in Aptheker. There the Court
applied the principle to its analysis of section 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act, 66 citing Shelton v. Tucker:67
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
68
It is submitted that the above principle has application to the bail prob-
lem. Accordingly, the Proposed Code is constitutionally deficient in several
important respects. The Proposed Code not only establishes the widest discre-
tion to "broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties," but indeed encourages
that result when it establishes an order of priorities which makes the most
difficult bail condition the easiest and most likely, to be imposed.69 This order
of priorities should be reversed, so as to require the court to at least make an
affirmative decision if it is to deny an accused his pretrial freedom. Next, if
that decision is to be made at all, it should be made visibly. If the bail con-
ditions are too burdensome for the accused to meet, for all practical purposes
the court has decided to imprison a man for an undetermined length of time,
with all that decision entails in terms of the ultimate outcome of the prosecution.
On the assumption that a fundamental and preferred freedom is being abridged,
it seems obvious that the accused should be accorded a hearing with an oppor-
tunity to present the relevant facts; that the District Attorney should have
the burden of proof; and that the court should be required to make findings of
fact, setting forth whatever reasons it may have for its decision. In addition,
64. See generally, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
65. See generally, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
66. 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785.
67. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
68. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964).
69. Proposed Code, § 280.10.
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the burden of proof on the question of likelihood of flight should be allocated
to the State, and the burden should be a heavy one.70
Wbile it may be inappropriate to further stretch the first amendment
analogy, it should be emphasized that we are dealing with a crucially important
personal freedom which, until recently, has been treated in rather cavalier
fashion. Judges have set bail without inquiry into the defendant's financial
ability, and have given little thought to the consequences of their actions.
Some men are detained while others, in exactly the same circumstances, are
freed on their own recognizance because they happened to appear before a
different judge.71
Although judicial discretion should not be completely eliminated in this
area, the vague and invisible standards now employed in the setting of bail lend
themselves to arbitrary decisions which result in the unnecessary imprisonment
of large numbers of persons. One aspect of the Supreme Court's "void for
vagueness" doctrine 72 is the necessity to impose strict and enforceable standards
governing state action which tends to abridge constitutional rights. The ab-
sence of such standards results in ". . . sweeping and improper application . . .
and to selective enforcement against unpopular causes."73 Thus, without strict
standards in regard to bail, pretrial detention has at times been employed as
a device for securing a guilty plea.7 4 Detention has also been used as punish-
ment when the court has felt that the defendant or his counsel has been dila-
tory.7 5 Yet, despite the existence of these concededly improper motives, the
Proposed Code endorses the questionable concept of preventive detention as a
consideration in determining whether to set bail.
D. Preventive Detention
The preventive detention idea of the Proposed Code76 introduces to New
York law a concept which until now has been almost universally regarded
70. See, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See also, Pretrial Release, ABA
Project on Criminal Justice, Tentative Draft § 5(1) (ABA ed. 1966).
71. The Judiciary Committee of the New York State Assembly, in 1963, conducted
an extensive investigation into the bail problem within the New York City Criminal Court
System. The Committee concluded that bail is often fixed mechanically without regard to
the individual defendant's circumstances. The applicable laws: ". . . are disregarded or are
perverted in a disturbingly large number of cases. We believe that a large segment of the
bench and of the Criminal bar (in which we include the staffs of district attorneys) have
forgotten-or never really learned-that the only permissible function of bail is to assure
reappearance." Judiciary Committee Hearings, N.Y. Legis. Doc., 963, No. 37, p. 249.
72. For a concise explanation of this doctrine, see Note, The Void-For Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
73. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1965).
74. See, People ex rel. Thompson v. Warden, 214 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.
1961).
75. Cf. People v. Olan, 8 N.Y.2d 1084, 1086 (1960).
76. Proposed Code § 275.30(2) (b) states, in part: "To the extent that the issuance of
an order of recognizance or bail and the terms thereof are matters of discretion rather than
of law, an application must be determined on the basis of the following factors and criteria.
... Where the principal is a defendant in a criminal action or proceeding or a defendant-
appellant in a pending appeal from a judgment of conviction, the likelihood that he would
be a danger to society or to himself if at liberty during the pendency of the action or pro-
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as an illegal consideration in the determination of whether to set bail.77 Be-
cause it seems that judges have taken the factor of preventive detention into
account despite its presumed illegality, it was apparently felt that the concept
should be candidly recognized. Another reason for condonation might be that
the practice "has the approval of the general public." Furthermore, the revisers
believe that such detention is necessary in many instances for the protection
of the public.78
Although this section of the Proposed Code does not on its face discrim-
inate between the wealthy defendant thought to be dangerous and those who
are poor, there is a de facto discrimination which works against the poor, with
equally harsh results. "Wealthy" defendants, i.e., those defendants who are
not indigent and who are able to post a reasonable amount of bail, are not
likely to be accused of crimes which fall into the dangerous category; nor do
they ordinarily confront the police in hostile relationships. The charges levelled
against them are usually "white collar" crimes. Poorer defendants, on the other
hand, tend to commit the majority of "economic" crimes which involve not
only an ascertainable victim who is likely to be injured, but also a forcible
arrest. Even where the court suspects that a wealthy defendant represents a
danger to society, it does not follow that the defendant will be held in- pre-
ventive detention. Assuming that the defendant is able to make bail, it would
seem that the state has gained nothing at the cost of authorizing the imprison-
ment of large numbers of poor people on the most speculative of grounds. The
state has gained nothing because there is no reason to believe that an otherwise
dangerous defendant will be rendered less dangerous simply because the bonds-
man requires greater collateral for his release. The condition under which the
collateral is forfeited is simply the willful failure to return to court at the
appointed time. The commission of other crimes is irrelevant. Therefore, the
net effect of this section is to imprison the poor on dubious constitutional
grounds and on even less tenable policy grounds.
When we consider that the Proposed Code authorizes a judicial finding of
probable cause to hold a defendant in custody for grand jury action solely on
ceeding. In determining that matter, the court must, on the basis of available information
consider and take into account:
(i) The defendant's character, reputation, habits, and mental condition; and
(ii) The nature of the offense or offenses with which he is charged or of which he has
been convicted in the action or proceeding involved;
(iii) His previous criminal record if any, and the nature and number of offenses of
which he has been convicted and with which he has been charged." (emphasis added).
77. See People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N.Y. 109, 71 N.E.2d 108 (194-7).
Preventive detention has been condemned by a Supreme Court Justice on at least one oc-
casion. In Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (1950), Justice Jackson, sitting as a
'Circuit Judge observed: "Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsum-
mated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses
and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to
supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted." Id.
at 282. Significantly, Justice Jackson had before him a bail application after conviction.
78. See, Proposed Code, § 390.20, comm'n staff notes.
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the basis of hearsay or otherwise imcompetent evidence,79 the preventive de-
tention provisions take on an even more disturbing aspect. Consider the following
hypothetical: The defendant is accused of molesting a little girl. The girl, 9
years of age, had identified him as her assailant three weeks after the event. She
is the only witness. Fifteen years prior to the instant prosecution, the defendant
had been convicted of statutory rape. The parents of the girl, as is most often the
case, are understandably fearful of the harmful psychological effects of a court
appearance. As a result, they testify at the preliminary hearing that their
daughter identified the defendant at a stated time and place as the man who
had attacked her. The girl does not testify. The judge, on the basis of this
testimony holds the matter for grand jury action. Turning to the standards set
forth in the Proposed Code which would authorize preventive detention, we
find that the defendant meets all of the qualifications. Although the prosecu-
tion's case is exceedingly weak, the defendant may well be detained for months
solely on the basis of the evidence elicited at the hearing and on the ground
that he is dangerous.
While it must be conceded that there may be instances where release of a
particular defendant would represent potential extreme danger to the public thus
warranting pretrial detention, that decision should not be lumped together with
the question of bail. It should be treated separately without regard to whether
the defendant is able to post bail. If he is found to be dangerous, and no other
alternative exists, he should be held in custody and special procedures should
be instituted to guarantee a swift adjudication of guilt or innocence.
Clearly, however, the procedures and standards under which a determina-
tion of societal danger may be made need drastic revision. The finding of
dangerousness should be predicated on substantial, competent evidence tending to
establish guilt of the particular offense and offering clear and compelling
evidence that the defendant is in fact a dangerous person. A preventive detention
hearing should be authorized only under rigidly controlled criteria. Given the
highly unpredictable quality of the determination that a particular defendant,
as opposed to others similarly situated, is likely to commit a dangerous crime
while on bail, the hearing itself should probably be authorized only in cases
where the defendant by past record has indicated a propensity toward violent
crime. It is suggested that propensity would be indicated by convictions for two
felonies involving serious injury to the victims. Additionally, the crime with
which the defendant is charged should be one of felony grade, involving violence.
Authorizing preventive detention under the loose standards set forth in the
Proposed Code may well result in the detaining of defendants who, for one
reason or another, have earned the enmity of the arresting officer. The question
of dangerousness could be answered on this officer's word. This is particularly
relevant in light of the escalating hostility between ghetto residents and the
police. In this situation, disorderly conduct complaints often result in dubious
79. See, Proposed Code § 90.50.
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felonious assault and resisting arrest charges. The latter are frequently dis-
missed in exchange for acknowledgment of guilt on the lesser disorderly conduct
charge and imprisonment is rarely imposed. Pretrial detention under these cir-
cumstances would be a gross injustice. The Proposed Code should not open
the door to that possibility by permitting too broad a judicial discretion.
As a final safeguard against unjust detentions, there should be a convincing
showing that other means of assuring the complainant's safety and the safety of
the public at large are unavailable. These could include such methods as daily
reporting to a probation officer, police guard or some other means of protection
short of absolute detention.
It would be anamolous indeed if the fourth amendment continued to pro-
hibit the relatively brief detention of an arrest on less than probable cause,
while lengthy pre-trial detentions, based on unjust considerations, remained valid.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has dealt solely with those aspects of the Proposed Code's bail
provisions which this writer has felt are in need of serious revision. There are
several bail reforms contained in the Proposed Code which merit praise, most
notably the provisions relating to appearance tickets.80 Expressions of approval
with respect to these provisions will be forthcoming, no doubt, from a variety of
sources. However, the need for reform is so great and the failures of this pro-
posal so serious that the critical approach is taken here in the hope that the
needed revision will be incorporated before the proposal now before the legisla-
ture becomes law.
80. Id. § 75.10.
